



REPORT  
OF  
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE  
ON  
DEFENSE OF SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES

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## SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE OF SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES

L. MENDEL RIVERS, Chairman

F. EDWARD HÉBERT, Louisiana

## **REPORT OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE OF SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES**

Pursuant to the direction of the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, the Honorable Carl Vinson, a special two-man subcommittee proceeded to Colorado Springs, Colo., during the period March 30-April 1, 1962, to confer with military authorities at Headquarters, North American Air Defense Command, concerning problems in connection with the defense of the southeastern United States against airborne attack, either by enemy missiles or aircraft.

In order that the subject may be placed in clearer perspective, some discussion of the background which led to the formation of Norad and the location of defense capabilities against enemy air attack is required.

In the early 1950's, it was conceded that practically the entire enemy air threat against the continental United States and Canada was confined to the long-range bomber capability of the Soviet Union. In connection with that assessment, it was presumed that any enemy air attack would be directed across the pole and that a proper defense against it would necessitate the concentration of our defenses in the northern portion of the United States and Canada.

The weapons systems then available or under development to perform this defense mission consisted of the Nike-Ajax and its successor, Nike-Hercules, fighter interceptor aircraft, the Bomarc missile, and associated radar detection systems such as the Dew-Line, the Mid-Canada Line, the Pine Tree Line, SAGE, Missile Master, and other types of radar support equipment.

Having concluded that the threat would come from the north, the available defensive systems were deployed in a manner which was calculated to do two things: (1) protect industrial complexes in the northern half of the United States, and (2) protect SAC bases in order to insure that SAC would retain a retaliatory capability.

The implementation of the foregoing program resulted in the establishment of numerous Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules ground-to-air missile units around major industrial cities and strategic air bases. Bomarc units, in limited numbers, were deployed in coastal areas. On the Atlantic coast, none was deployed south of Norfolk, Va. Fighter interceptor bases were established at numerous locations as far north as possible within the continental United States.

Within the time frame in which these decisions were made and implementation occurred, the actions were undoubtedly valid. The bomber threat was principally from the north and to the south there appeared to be nothing but friendly nations. But the situation which prevails today is vastly different, making the threat nationwide rather than geographically limited.

Within the past 10 years, the concentration of industry, defense, and other activities of national importance has made the contribution of the southeastern portion of the United States to the overall national effort of prime importance.

One need only consider the activities which now lie in a broad arc extending from Norfolk, Va., southward along the gulf coast to Houston, Tex. In addition to the large and expanding population centers within the area, we have now concentrated a major effort in the exploration of outer space. These new activities extend from the establishment of the new Space Center at Houston, to test sites in Mississippi, work on the Saturn booster in Louisiana, the launching complex at Cape Canaveral, and the prime scientific efforts which are conducted at Huntsville, Ala. Important segments of the aviation industry, now making a major contribution to our national defense, are located within the area. New Polaris submarine facilities have been established at Charleston. Interspersed throughout the area are major defense activities of all the military services, including bases for Strategic Air Force units.

While the vastly increased importance of this area to the overall national effort is clear, it is equally clear that no significant effort has been made to provide a degree of protection which is comparable in any degree to that previously provided for similar areas in the northern half of the Nation.

From the standpoint of local defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles, the entire Nation is equally vulnerable. But the threat from hostile aircraft and airbreathing missiles which can be launched from ships, submarines, or hostile territory remains a continuing concern to southeastern United States. This is accentuated by the marked political change which has occurred in those nations to the south and southeast of the United States.

Central and South America present many areas of political foment with the conflict between freedom and democracy remaining in doubt. The same situation presents itself in certain areas of Africa. But the most immediate concern is the establishment of a devout Communist government in Cuba, within 90 miles of Florida.

The Soviet buildup of a military capability in Cuba continues at an increased tempo. The most modern jet fighter aircraft appear in increasing numbers on Cuban airfields. Soviet "technicians" continue to arrive in increasing numbers and there can be no assurance that this buildup does not forecast the establishment of a missile capability in Cuba as a hostile threat to continental United States.

While fighter aircraft have known limitations as to range and weapon-carrying capability, this threat cannot be ignored. If it is contended that the Soviet Union would not release atomic weapons for these aircraft to Cuban forces, there can be no guarantee that such weapons would not be available to Soviet military personnel operating from Cuban bases, at the chosen moment.

In addition, we must now concede an in-flight refueling capability for long-range Soviet aircraft, with reasonable assurance that Cuba, as well as some other possible areas to the south, would be available as staging areas for in-flight refueling of Soviet bombers. No one can now successfully contend that the sole threat of Soviet attack by aircraft or airbreathing missiles is limited to the northern approach. The threat is now total and our defensive capabilities must be adjusted to meet it.

The subcommittee recommends that immediate action be instituted to place both improved fighter interceptor and ground-to-air missile protection in strategic areas in southeastern United States. As a

corollary to this capability, a marked improvement in radar intercept and communications capability would be essential.

The subcommittee recognizes that the optimum which could be accomplished in this area at this time is firm planning for a positive approach. Therefore, the subcommittee recommends that the Secretary of Defense be urged to institute such plans and be prepared to report to the House Committee on Armed Services in January 1963 the positive steps which have been taken to overcome the deficiencies in the defense of southeastern United States.

Respectfully submitted.

L. MENDEL RIVERS.  
F. EDWARD HÉBERT.

AUGUST 23, 1962.



and the  $\beta$ -adrenergic receptor antagonist propranolol. In contrast, the  $\alpha_1$ -adrenergic receptor agonist phenylephrine increased the rate of  $\text{Ca}^{2+}$  entry. These results suggest that the  $\text{Ca}^{2+}$  entry pathway is under tonic inhibition by adrenergic receptors.

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[No. 74]

**FULL COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION  
876, TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER UNITS AND MEM-  
BERS IN THE READY RESERVE TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR NOT MORE  
THAN 12 MONTHS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, D.C., September 13, 1962.*

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., Hon. Carl Vinson (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**THE CHAIRMAN.** Now, members, let's come to order.

Members of the committee, we are called together to consider a resolution that I introduced on September 10.

Mr. Smart, will you please read this resolution?

Mr. SMART (reading):

**HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 876**

*Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That notwithstanding any other provision of law, until January 31, 1963, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than one hundred fifty thousand members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until January 31, 1963, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service, or other military status, in any component of an armed force or in the National Guard that expire before February 28, 1963, for not more than 12 months. However, if the enlistment of a member of the Ready Reserve who is ordered to active duty under the first section of this Act would expire after February 28, 1963, but before he has served the entire period for which he was so ordered to active duty, his enlistment may be extended until the last day of that period.

Sec. 3. No member of the Ready Reserve who was involuntarily ordered to active duty under the Act of August 1, 1961, Public Law 87-117 (75 Stat. 242), may be involuntarily ordered to active duty under this Act.

Sec. 4. This Act becomes effective on the day after the Eighty-seventh Congress adjourns sine die.

**THE CHAIRMAN.** Now, members of the committee, this is an executive session, and what happens in here this morning is classified.

Now we have this morning the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, the committee will be glad to have you submit any fact as to why the Congress should act favorably upon this resolution.

## STATEMENT OF SECRETARY McNAMARA

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a very brief statement I would like to read, if that is acceptable to you, and then I will be prepared to answer questions.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Have we copies of your statement?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Yes, sir.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Here it is. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Thank you.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I am appearing today in support of the House joint resolution you referred to and that was just read, 876, introduced last Monday.

I am very grateful to you and to the members of your committee for affording me so prompt an opportunity to testify on the proposal which the President considers to be of very, very great importance.

The House resolution on its face is an interim measure. It is designed to provide the President with authority while the Congress is out of session to order a limited number of members of our Ready Reserves to active duty for a maximum period of 12 months if in the judgment of the President the security requirement of our country so dictates.

The resolution specifically limits, as you know, the number of reservists that may be called to not more than 150,000. And further it provides that no member of the Ready Reserve involuntarily ordered to active duty under Public Law 87-117, which expired on July 1, may be involuntarily ordered to active duty under this act.

And it is our sincere hope, Mr. Chairman, that it will not be necessary to invoke the authority contained in this proposed resolution.

One hundred and forty-eight thousand of the reservists, soldiers, sailors, and airmen, responded to the call last year, which was dictated by the current and immediate crisis of last fall.

Almost without exception they serve with distinction and they serve with remarkably little complaint.

Their response to the call, we believe, provided tangible evidence in the clearest manner possible of the ability and determination of this country to respond at whatever sacrifice when our vital security interests are involved, as they were then and as they may be in the future.

I am sure there is no need for me to elaborate to this committee on the situation that confronts us today.

I understand that you were briefed yesterday along with the Foreign Affairs Committee on the current world situation.

President Kennedy has made crystal clear his recognition of the threats with which we are faced and of the policy of this Government not to allow the export of Communist aggressive purposes by force, in this hemisphere or in other areas of the world.

It is obvious to all Americans that we are in a period of acute international tension. It is also obvious that the forces opposed to us have the capability to precipitate crises, at the moment of their choosing, in many parts of the world—and that we must be able to respond promptly and decisively.

The authority requested in this resolution would permit such a prompt response, short of measures which would require the declara-

tion of a national emergency—an action which would involve implications of a most serious nature.

The potential need for a callup of Reserve Forces to meet the military requirements similar to those imposed upon us a year ago has been considerably reduced.

Our conventional capability has been greatly enhanced during that period by the addition of 5 Army combat divisions, bringing our total to 16.

The Marine Corps has increased its active strength to the 190,000 men authorized by the Congress.

The Navy and Air Force have made commensurate improvements in operational capability through realinement of units and modernization of surface and air equipment.

The Strike Command, which combines the tactical units of the Army and the Air Force in this country, is now organized and has undergone tests and field exercises.

Our regular military forces are strong today, and their strength continues to improve.

The authority for a limited callup of Reserves, however, would provide us with a flexibility of response which could be crucial if the international situation deteriorates suddenly and specific crises occur.

Inasmuch as the nature and seriousness of such crises are unpredictable, I cannot state at this time a firm anticipated requirement for the call of numbers and types of units. Alternative plans have been developed, however, which can be refined and implemented promptly when and if a requirement is established.

In summary, then, Mr. Chairman, I wish to emphasize that the President and the Defense Establishment are acutely aware of and very grateful for the sacrifice and the devotion to duty which was recently demonstrated by our Reserve Forces.

Those who have responded to that call will not be reordered to active duty under the authority now requested. We hope that this authority will not have to be invoked at all.

But we are faced with a period of a few months, with the Congress out of session, at any time during which we may face a challenge requiring an immediate and effective response.

The enactment of House Joint Resolution 876 will constitute an endorsement by the American people of our determination to make that response, to make it promptly, decisively, and the resolution will provide us with the means to do so.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I understood when I got back to the office this morning that a hearing was had in the Senate and that the Senate has recommended favorable approval of this resolution, with certain Senate amendments.

Now, before we go into the matter, I want to clear this phase of it up.

Have you examined those Senate amendments?

Mr. Smart, will you be kind enough to read what the Senate amendments were?

Mr. SMART. Mr. Slatinshek has them, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Slatinshek, will you read them?

**Mr. SLATINSHEK.** On page 1 of the resolution, lines 3 and 4, strike out "January 31" and insert "February 28" in lieu thereof.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, what have you to say in reference to the Senate amendment, Mr. Secretary?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** This is desirable, I believe, Mr. Chairman, in order to extend the authority to cover the weeks of the initial organization of the new Congress.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well, the only question is, on the date, how long?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Yes; it extends for 4 weeks—

**The CHAIRMAN.** All right.

**Secretary McNAMARA** (continuing). The period of authority.

**The CHAIRMAN.** That is right.

**Mr. VAN ZANDT.** Why?

**The CHAIRMAN.** What is the next amendment?

**Mr. VAN ZANDT.** Why the extension?

**Mr. SLATINSHEK.** May I respond to that, Mr. Chairman—

**Secretary McNAMARA.** If I may, please?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Yes, Mr. Secretary.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** The authority is extended because the Senate believed that during the early weeks of the Congress it would not be timely or appropriate to take immediate or precipitate action on subject of this kind.

The resolution is inconsistent as it was originally drafted because the early sentences referred to January 31 for certain purposes and certain similar but not identical purposes recovered later by February 28.

**Mr. VAN ZANDT.** All right.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** And consistency would require that either the February 28 date be changed or the January 31 date be changed, and the Senate chose to change the January 31 date, and this is entirely acceptable to us.

We want to emphasize, and did emphasize in the original drafting of the resolution, that this is an interim measure designed to cover situation that may arise while Congress is out of session or during the early weeks of its organization.

**Mr. VINSON.** Now, what is the next amendment that the Senate offered?

**Mr. SLATINSHEK.** On page 1, beginning on line 5, strike out "and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in—" and insert in lieu thereof "or any member, of," in lieu thereof.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now they struck that out.

**Secretary McNamara.** Mr.—

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Secretary, what have you to say in reference to that amendment?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Mr. Chairman, we are quite willing to accept the resolution either as it was originally presented or as the Senate has suggested it be modified.

**The CHAIRMAN.** I see.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** If you wish a word of explanation, I think I can explain why they did what they did.

**The CHAIRMAN.** That is right.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** The Senate believed that some of the problems associated with the callup of last fall could have been avoided

and we had at that time the authority to call individual members assigned to units when their unit was not to be called. And it was to permit that action that they proposed to modify the resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the reservist can be plucked out of an organized unit?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of his organization. And under the 1961 call, he had to be in the organization—the unit had to be called?

Secretary McNAMARA. If he was assigned to a unit.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary McNAMARA. Organized to serve as a unit he would be called only as part of the unit under the 1961 resolution and under the draft as we presented it to the Congress last week.

The Senate chose to change that. It increases our flexibility. We would propose, if the Senate language is endorsed by the House, to use such authority only very sparingly, because we understand it to be the sense of Congress that units organized to serve as units should remain so constituted that they can serve as units.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary McNAMARA. Which means that they should not be fragmented and torn apart with individual assignments to other units.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you much prefer—while you would have the authority, you much prefer to call the unit instead of plucking the individuals out of the unit, is that correct?

Secretary McNAMARA. We understand that that is the sense and intention of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary McNAMARA. That we should act that way, and we believe it is also militarily sound to act that way.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, at that particular point may I direct the attention of the Secretary that in the last callup such was the language.

However, the Air Force violated that language and did pluck individuals from units, and it was sustained by the Department of Defense attorney as well as the Air Force attorney?

Secretary McNAMARA. There were I believe—

Mr. HÉBERT. There was a suit filed—there was a case filed in which the Federal court upheld the Department's position, but the testimony before the committee indicated, in fact, stated, that the callup was authorized and ordered by the Air Force without the legal authority, which was only obtained after the spirit and the letter of the law had been violated.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I believe that Mr. Hébert is entirely correct, that the Air Force did call a certain number of individuals, I have forgotten the number—I believe it was 150 or something on that order—from units.

[Deleted.]

Mr. HÉBERT. You could not be more frank and fair.

Mr. RIVERS. Let me ask the Secretary a question right there.

So the Senate provision is going to give you this wide latitude to call people irrespective of their attachment to a unit?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

**Mr. RIVERS.** Now out of 180 million people, or 185 million people, can't you get 150,000 men without going all over hell's half acre, to put them not attached to units?

This to me is incredible.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Mr. Rivers, I think the answer is we believe so, and therefore, we did not propose that this authority be granted to the Department.

On the other hand, there are certain rather unique situations, which the Air Force example is one, in which the additional authority granted by the Senate might be in the interests of the Nation.

I think in the great majority of cases we could avoid using such authority, and that is why I say that even if the Congress provides it to us we will use it very sparingly.

**Mr. RIVERS.** The reason I say this: I handled the Hébert committee for 4 years. And we have reams of testimony before the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana took over—and he has done a magnificent job. I hope that the spirit of all this testimony will not be violated and that you, Mr. Secretary, will insist that these organized units be first activated—and this positively will be given you—before you go over here and disrupt all of these things that are not necessary. And I think the restraint of the Congress was commendable when these violations occurred.

All of us have done so. And I trust you won't permit that to happen unless it is imperative.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Well, I fully support your conclusions. I think the Senate feels exactly the same way. [Deleted.]

**Mr. RIVERS.** Because we know something about the Reserves. We have been living with them. We know a lot of them.

You would be surprised what we know about these Reserve people. And they have some good units.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Van Zandt, any questions?

**Mr. VAN ZANDT.** Mr. Secretary, as Mr. Rivers has mentioned, we have lived with this Reserve matter for many years. And as I go back over a period of possibly 10 years of study which resulted in the Reserve Act, I think, of 1962, we spent some time on this question of a callup of an individual or a Reserve unit. And we went into every phase of it.

I think that one thing we agreed on was that when you call up a unit you protect the morale of that unit, but when you pick out an individual of a unit then you destroy, or you begin to destroy, the morale of a unit.

Now, if we were short of Reserves, as someone has said, then I think maybe this authority would be necessary. But inasmuch as we are not short of Reserves, I can't see why we should give it to you.

Now we can be back here in a matter of 24 hours, from many sections of the United States, and if there is any emergency where you need authority to call up an individual as a member of a functioning unit, I think you will get it.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Pike, have you any questions?

"Go right ahead."

**Mr. PIKE.** Well, I would like to, along the same line, ask a question about the same subject matter.

You are talking about the necessity of calling individuals under some circumstances.

This necessity is going to exist only because units are called up at less than full strength. Otherwise, there would not be any need to call up individuals.

Now, I don't know what your plans call for as far as what strength units you are going to call up.

But if you are going to call up units at 50 percent strength, then this is, again, going to be a tremendous problem. And I would like to know in that connection what the policy is going to be as between calling out members or picking members out of organized units—

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. PIKE. Or calling prior service people.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mc. Pike, we have a number of different kinds of situations. I will try to refer to several in answering your question.

We have the case of Army units in the Reserve and Guard which are at relatively low strength, such as 50 or 60 or 70 percent, as you have indicated.

Were those units to be called, it would be necessary to fill out their strength.

We would not under ordinary circumstances fill out their strength even if we had the authority to do so by calling individuals from other units.

Rather we would fill out their strength by the pool of reservists with remaining obligated service which we have set up, as I stated to this committee we would do last January, when I appeared before it.

One of the greatest problems that we faced last fall and one that your subcommittee emphasized and pointed to was the problem of filling out short units with personnel with the essential skills and with remaining periods of obligated service.

Last year we did not have a pool of personnel identified by name, by military occupation specialty, and by period of remaining obligated service.

This year we do.

And we would call from that pool of individuals not assigned to units in order to fill out these units.

Now the first people to be called from that pool, and as a matter of fact, we believe we have enough in the pool to fill all such requirements, would be those with only 6 months active duty service.

We have specially selected those individuals by skills for this purpose, and we believe that we could fill the Army requirements therefore in any likely situation by such individuals.

In the case of the Air Force, we have a different problem. We are expanding the number of tactical fighter squadrons by about 35 percent.

Many of the new squadrons are in the process of organization. They are not yet operational.

If we face situations that required an acceleration of their operational readiness, it might be necessary to call from the Reserve and Guard individuals small in number but highly important because of the particular occupational specialty they fill.

Conceivably, although I think even there it is unlikely we would have to call those individuals from Reserve or Guard units.

Mr. PIKE. Well, I think it is important to get this on the record at this time. Because what you have here is a resolution which specifically exempts the people who were called up last year.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. PIKE. Some of these people have served—in fact, I guess probably about half of these people have served only 18 months total service.

(Secretary McNamara nods.)

Mr. PIKE. But at the same time your resolution specifically allows you to call up other people who have served say 3 years of prior service?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. PIKE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now—

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Becker?

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, one point I would like to make here, that was just raised.

We called up 147,000 reservists—or just released them. And you are talking about a possible emergency, during this interim, of having to call up these Reserves. Of what possible good will these Reserves be, being unskilled, untrained, unready, to go into some kind of action, as against Reserves you have just disbanded, after a course of 6 or 8 months, of so-called intensive training and preparation?

You are going to call up a group, and then you are going to take them out of units and you are going to reassign to other units, where there is going to be a breakdown of morale.

Actually what is going to be accomplished in this interim, with a callup of this nature?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have two questions here, I believe.

Mr. BECKER. That is right.

Secretary McNAMARA. One is what is the combat readiness of Reserves, presumably units, that we might call up in this period of time that the Congress may be out of session, compared to the combat readiness of the units we just recently deactivated.

And the answer is very clear.

The units would be called up that would have a lesser degree of combat readiness than the units deactivated. I think that is perfectly apparent.

Mr. BECKER. What value are they going to be in this short period?

Secretary McNAMARA. Very great potential value, depending upon the situation we face.

I think I mentioned to this committee earlier this year that around about December 11 of last year I visited a fighter wing in France that had been called to active duty in October, had been moved to Europe in November, and was declared combat operational by the U.S. Air Force commander in Europe in mid to late November, around the 18th.

So that in a period of 5 or 6 weeks these air squadrons, in this case from Massachusetts and New York, had been called to active duty, moved to Europe, put through combat training and checked out as combat operational.

And we think we could do that again with different units.

**Mr. BECKER.** Well, Mr. Secretary, I hope you will read the testimony in the hearings we had as to the combat readiness of those New York air wings and the lack of equipment they had over there, and the long time they were over there before they even got it.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well—

**Mr. BECKER.** Wait, Mr. Chairman.

I just wondered this: Because there is also the question of the need. Are we, when talking about these units now, speaking of individuals who are going to break from units and then put them in with units, and then the solid units we are going to bring up, and the interim authority that the President wants between the time Congress adjourns and February 28—is this for a clear-cut military potential need. [Deleted.]

**Mr. BECKER.** Mr. Chairman, I have just one final question—

**Mr. OSMERS.** Mr. Chairman?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Wait a moment.

I will recognize everybody, but I cannot do it all at one time.

**Mr. BECKER.** Just one final question, on the same subject. It has to do with the briefing we had yesterday, Mr. Secretary. I am just trying to be as fair as you are on this. [Deleted.]

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Thank you, Mr. Becker.

**Mr. OSMERS.** Mr. Chairman.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Osmers.

**Mr. OSMERS.** Mr. Chairman, I was at the briefing yesterday morning, too, and I think I will say that it was probably one of the most depressing mornings that I have had since I have been a Member of Congress.

I didn't learn anything about the international situation that I didn't either know or suspect.

I was depressed by the apparent lack of any real policy on our part to meet with it.

Now, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the passage of a resolution such as this which would add 150,000 reservists to our forces and we have to give a written guarantee in here that we won't call the ones that we just trained—we have to guarantee that we will call some other ones—

(Secretary McNamara nods.)

**Mr. OSMERS.** It seems to me that this hampers the President, rather than helps. Maybe it may have some public relations value, but I think it is ridiculous in a world with millions of men under arms to think that we are going to call up 150,000 reservists and somehow be able to react as might be required. [Deleted.] This is so laughable I won't discuss it before this committee.

So I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we back our President, that we support our President, and that we pass this resolution, but that we strike out the date, and that we put a period after "active duty," so that it reads—

that notwithstanding any other provision of law the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit or any member of the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty.

I believe that the President needs our support, and that we should give it to him, and we shouldn't tie him all up with string and ribbon and twine in doing his task.

We do face a national emergency. He has the authority under the Constitution to do it, as we know.

So I say if we are going [deleted] to support him, let's support him Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Mr. Osmers—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

The CHAIRMAN. One minute.

In other words, Mr. Osmers, if you are going to do a job, do an outstanding job.

Mr. OSMERS. Let's do the job that is needed to help the Nation and help the President.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. I will recognize everybody.

Mr. Secretary, have you any answer you want to make at this time to the suggestion of Mr. Osmers, or would you rather make that later on after you think about it?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would prefer to answer later.

But I would like to say this, that we see circumstances that can develop in which we would respond more promptly and with greater strength were we to have the authority requested, and that is why it is being requested.

Now, the proposal made would give us greater flexibility, and therefore I won't oppose it.

I would like to think further about it, however, and respond more fully later.

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute.

Mr. RIVERS. We will take this up later on and discuss it.

Secretary McNAMARA. All right, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. Now, Mr. Secretary, you have ordered the Howze board to study—and I am glad that General Lemnitzer is here, because he has been more prophetic than anybody I know in uniform as to the need for more mobility in our military. And I have in mind airlift.

Now you have convened the Howze Board. I am not familiar with what they have recommended to you. I understand that their recommendation is on your desk, or presently will be. You have not seen it. I don't know what it contains.

But I understand it is designed to give more mobility to the Army.

Now you need certain internal flying capacity or airlift, tactical airlift, for the Army units.

And I am sure that this report deals with the Army mobility as it affects—it is affected by what the Tactical Air Command can give it. One will run into the other.

Now I imagine it has to do with helicopters and fixed wing aircraft of the varying types about which we have been briefed in our 412 hearings.

Now here is my question. While time remains, why don't we concern ourselves to these two areas—internal airlift for the Army and

the troops to go along with it? This 150,000 men may be fine. But we ought to address ourselves now, General Lemnitzer, to this airlift and the troops to go along with it.

We saw what happened to the French in Indochina, when their people were there and that was it. They didn't have it. So if we have trouble in Berlin—for your information, the American people are more concerned with Cuba.

Now if they got into difficulty, they would rather die defending Key West, Fla., than Berlin or Laos.

But wherever they die, let's give them the tools while the time remains.

And I want to ask you this. Don't you think it is imperative that we give the Army now these things they need, which are these two areas—the tactical internal capacity which they don't now have, along with the troops to go with it? This to me is vital. Because we are going to have these things, Mr. Secretary, as long as you can remember—these things that are coming up right now. [Deleted.]

We ought to have this capacity for the Department of the Army. Now we are beefing up our strategic airlift.

And I want to commend you for this.

And also for this Howze report, whatever it contains. And I assume it is addressing itself to this. But we have time now to do this.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any answer on that question, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. RIVERS. I want to ask you: Don't you think we should have a permanent increase, at least two more mobile divisions to the Army, along with the required aircraft?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, the Howze study—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait 1 minute, Mr. Secretary,

Let there be order, members, so we can hear what the Secretary has to say.

Secretary McNAMARA. The Howze study was started because we believe there might be a requirement for additional mobility and/or additional tactical air support for the current Army divisions.

General Howze was appointed to undertake the study. He organized a group of officers to assist him. They have done I believe a remarkable job.

The report is presently being considered by the Army and will come to me in due time, within the next few weeks.

I don't wish to anticipate what its conclusions will be or what action we will take on them.

[Deleted.]

The action that we would take, however, is very important. I don't think that we should try to rush it in order to save a few weeks.

The Howze report, as I say, was within the matter of the past 2 or 3 weeks sent to the Army headquarters. It is now being studied by the Army. It will come to me in time to be incorporated in the budget recommendations that we will present to the Congress in January of next year.

And I don't believe we should act now to try to prejudge the report.

This is a matter the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have an opportunity to consider, for a matter of days or weeks in any case.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

**Mr. RIVERS.** Wait.

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

**Mr. RIVERS.** Just before you finish. Of course you want to do it. But it points up your concern for the need for this mobility for the Army.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** It does.

**Mr. RIVERS.** It would be well in my judgment that you would think along the lines of increasing the Army, along the lines of additional mobile divisions. Because you will positively need them.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Thank you, Mr. Rivers.

**Mr. RIVERS.** I am sure you will get the help of the Congress.

**The CHAIRMAN.** I am going to recognize Mr. Winstead.

**Mr. WINSTEAD.** Mr. Chairman, I wanted to back up Mr. Osmers on his statement here. It seems to me he put his finger right on a very important point.

If we are in such a crisis that we need to call up 150,000 reservists and there is any real benefit to it at all, it seems to me it would be rather silly to turn around to say you can't use the best trained men we have if you get in an emergency.

I can't see any sense at all to that. It looks like to me it makes the Congress and the administration look silly to put that type of statement in this resolution.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well, I understood Mr. Osmers' thought was to strike out "until January 31, 1963."

**Mr. OSMERS.** Right, sir.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, we will take that up and talk to the Secretary.

**Mr. GUBSER.** Mr. Chairman—

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Arends.

**Mr. ARENDs.** Mr. Secretary, I wonder—

**The CHAIRMAN.** We won't reach any decision now.

**Mr. ARENDs.** I agree with you, Mr. Chairman.

**The CHAIRMAN.** We must debate this matter out and thrash it out and look into it very carefully. It is very important.

**Mr. ARENDs.** This Congress is going to be here a little while.

As I understand it doesn't have to be done today or Saturday or Tuesday or any one day.

We are going to be here a lot longer than some of you may think we are going to be here.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Go ahead, Mr. Arends.

Everyone will be recognized.

**Mr. ARENDs.** Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you if you would explain what in your own opinion, and those of your legal advisers, are the powers of the President at the present time.

If we fail to pass a resolution like this—of course we will pass it—doesn't he have certain inherent powers that he could do this?

What is your definition of what he can do and what he cannot do.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** The President, as I understand it, has the authority to declare a national emergency.

**Mr. ARENDs.** Yes.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** And having declared a national emergency has the authority to call up from the Reserve and Guard up to a million men.

But oddly enough, again as I understand it, he does not have authority under his national emergency powers to extend the term of enlistment of many of the personnel presently on active duty, particularly those in the Army and the Air Force.

And this is a power that is granted by the proposed joint resolution, which he does not have as part of his emergency powers.

And it is a very important power, in our opinion.

Mr. ARENDS. That is why, Mr. Secretary, I asked the question.

Because I think this should be made clear to a lot of people. Because this is one of the questions that comes up constantly.

And I think it ought to be made clear some way, why we don't do that.

Now one more thing. I hope that in this callup, if there is one [deleted].

But in this callup, I trust that a little bit more consideration can be given to just a general callup, the way we did the last time, and quit setting so many square pegs in round holes, and so forth, but where an analysis can be made of the background, training, and capacity of these individuals, many of whom went in and served absolutely no purpose whatsoever.

And I think probably with quick attention, which undoubtedly is now going on, you will be able to do a better job in that respect.

I think that is the basis of the trouble we had last time.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Arends, this is a serious problem.

Would you like to have a word of explanation of what was done and what can be done, we believe.

Mr. ARENDS. Yes, I think that is important.

Secretary McNAMARA. When I appeared before this committee a year ago asking for similar authority I stated that we would follow a set of priorities in expanding our forces.

We expanded the forces from 2,500,000 to about 2,800,000.

I stated we would look first to voluntary enlistments, secondly to voluntary recruitment, thirdly to the draft, and only fourthly to involuntary extensions of tours of duty and to involuntary callup from the Reserves, and finally when calling up from the Reserves we would look first to the Reserves on paid duty status and only later to those on unpaid status.

Now, we essentially followed those four priorities. We actually increased the strength 328,000 men.

Of the 328,000, 70,000 came from voluntary enlistment or voluntary recruitment; 47,000 came from increased draft calls; 63,000 came from involuntary extensions of tours of duty, of varying periods—1 month, 2 months, 4 months, 5 months, depending upon the individual and the service.

As was mentioned earlier, 148,000 were represented by reservists and guardists called to active duty.

Of the 148,000, 66,000 were men who had served only 6 months' active duty and who were therefore fulfilling their remaining Reserve obligation; 54,000 additional reservists were men on paid drill status.

And only 28,000, out of the 328,000, were men who had served more than 6 years of active duty and who were not on paid drill status.

And it was those men, small as they were as a percentage—9 percent of the total increase—who caused the greatest problem, and whom I think we managed less efficiently.

And our problems with those men were caused by the fact that the Reserve and Guard units that we called to active duty, particularly in the Army, were far below authorized table of organization strength levels. In some cases below 50 percent.

Moreover, the men, as Mr. Hébert's committee pointed out, were in many cases poorly qualified for their assignments. It had been the practice to accept men in Reserve and Guard units out of their military occupation specialty. And the combination of those two factors meant we had a great need for so-called filler personnel, to fill up these units.

That was the first problem.

The second problem came from the fact that we did not have a well-organized system for determining who among the individual reservists not assigned to units and therefore in the filler pool had, (a), the period of obligation, (b), the low period of active service, and (c), the military occupation specialty, that best fitted them for one of these filler roles.

And because we lacked information of that character, we had to pull individuals if not blindly at least without as much forethought and analysis as would have been desirable.

And the result was I think there were certain inequities and certain misassignments that accrued.

Today, as a result of that experience and as a result of 10 months of action this year we have carefully analyzed the filler pool in the Army. We have selected from the individuals who have low periods of active service, that is to say 6 months, who have long periods of remaining Reserve obligation and who do have particular types of military specialties, occupational abilities.

And those individuals have been identified by name and are kept on order, and this pool is being maintained up to date.

And it is through that action that I believe we can avoid many of these weaknesses which existed last year.

Mr. ARENDs. Thank you very much for that statement. Because that is reassuring.

Because, after all, these qualified individuals with the least amount of service are fellows who should have the attention this next time.

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly.

Mr. ARENDs. I am glad this is being done.

Might I just make a comment now, and that is all.

Mr. Secretary, like every other American citizen, I am concerned, just like you are, and what bothers me as I go around and talk to different groups, some political and some nonpolitical, we constantly run into this thing.

Everybody has a great concern about what is happening in this terrible upset world at the present time.

And I think just merely calling up the 150,000 reservists, which Mr. Osmers indicated a little while ago, isn't going to be enough.

I think somewhere along the line we are going to have the impression left of a more determined spirit on the part of all of us in the country, the 185 million of us, that we will go so far and no further.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Mr. Arends, we must let the world know we are positive and determined.

Mr. ARENDS. That is right. We can't say that we are just "going to knock the hell out of you," but somehow we must establish an affirmative intention.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. Bates.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Secretary, in your statement you said we are in a period of acute international tension—not a day or a month. This is something that will probably go on the rest of our lives.

Now a year ago when we considered the same measure—

The CHAIRMAN. Let there be order, members.

Mr. BATES. I indicated to you that planning on the part of this committee down through the years was to establish a military force that could carry us through this particular period without ups and downs, so that whatever came up along the lines of Berlin or Cuba, we would have the necessary force in being to cope with that situation.

Now, it was just in August that we let these Reserves go home, the ones that we needed so urgently last year. The situation really hasn't changed since August. It really hasn't changed since a year ago.

As a matter of fact, I would suspect that the threat next year and the years hereafter will be similar.

Now it seems to me if we need more military strength, rather than calling in untrained Reserves who only dissipate the strength of our Active Forces, because of the training which is needed for them, why don't we increase our military strength, to whatever figure is necessary to do the job?

Now maybe we ought to get in a couple more Army divisions.

I don't know how much equipment we have right now that would satisfy the needs for two divisions.

But why don't we approach it that way so we have a permanent cadre in there that can cope with these problems as they develop year in and year out, rather than calling 150,000 Reserves.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, I want a good answer to that, because that is what I spoke to you about earlier this morning and that is what I have been thinking all along.

Mr. RIVERS. This is what I asked you a while ago.

Mr. BATES. It has been the cardinal principle of this committee. We know how wasteful it is to call in inexperienced Reserves and let them go just about the time they are getting a small amount of basic training in their system.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think the answer is twofold.

First, we have increased our forces. We are increasing our forces. The increase in the number of combat ready divisions is 45 percent, July 1 of 1961 versus September 10 or whatever today is.

Mr. SMART. The 13th.

Secretary McNAMARA. So in this 14-month period there has been an actual 45 percent increase in the number of combat ready divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have to have reservists to support those two divisions. You haven't enough back up to support those two divisions right now.

Secretary McNAMARA. You are speaking—really there are eight combat ready divisions in this country in general reserve, and asso-

ciated combat and logistical support forces for those, and as I understand your point you are saying that the combat and logistical support forces are not fully adequate for the eight divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think the answer to that depends on a number of points.

In the first place, there are sources of Army personnel—

Mr. SMART. The chairman is talking about the two new Army divisions—

Secretary McNAMARA. No.

Mr. SMART. With some Reserve units for support. That is his question.

Secretary McNAMARA. There are sources of Army personnel for potential addition to the combat and logistical support units which the Army General Staff is presently considering.

We have, for example, about—you can check the figure here exactly, but I believe it is about 28,000 men assigned to combat training type units which conceivably can be assigned to the combat and logistical support forces.

The Army is presently considering such assignment. And there are other sources of additional personnel.

Under certain circumstances, I think it is correct to say that depending upon the area of deployment, the type of combat, that certain logistical support or combat support units from the Reserve would be needed if all 16 Army divisions were put in combat.

The CHAIRMAN. Now answer Mr. Bates' question: Why you do not desire to increase the Regular forces, instead of calling up civilians in this capacity as you are.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would emphasize—

The CHAIRMAN. Whether it is what you say, Mr. Secretary—I don't want to take Mr. Bates' time—but you stated:

It is obvious to all Americans that we are in a period of acute international tension. It is also obvious that the forces opposed to us have the capability of precipitating crises at the moment of their choosing, in many parts of the world, and that we must be able to respond promptly and decisively.

We assume this condition is going to continue indefinitely, until probably some shooting takes place. So why not try to increase our Regular Forces, build them up strong enough, instead of having to call up reservists every time a crisis breaks?

Now that naturally raises this question: If we had 1,055,000 men, as the Army has previously recommended, would you then desire the authority to call up Reserve units?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, yes, absolutely. Absolutely. And I would like to go back to my answer to Mr. Bates.

The first point I would make is, we have increased the forces. We have increased the combat ready divisions 45 percent.

We have underway a 35-percent increase in the number of tactical air squadrons.

The number of tactical air squadrons on July 1 of last year was 55. We are increasing that and have under training today the units to increase it to a total of 73, which is eighteen fifty-fifths, which is a 35-percent increase, of tactical air squadrons.

So the first point is, we are increasing.

The second point is that it is extremely important to keep these forces in balance at any one time, to keep the equipment in balance with the men, to keep the airlift in balance with the men and equipment to be moved.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Why can't we get both? Why can't we get an increase in manpower and an increase in equipment?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** The most important deficiency at the moment in relation to our Active Forces is in equipment deficiency.

This committee has pointed it out. We have taken action to overcome it. We have increased the percentage—we have increased the procurement of Army equipment, in ammunition, for example, by over 50 percent.

**Mr. BATES.** Wouldn't that be just as short for reservists as it would for Regular personnel?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** We have taken the reservists' requirements into account also.

I reviewed with this committee earlier this year the equipment deficiencies for the Active and Reserve Forces. Those are being filled at the present time.

But the principle of balance between equipment and men and particularly between types of forces—Air Force, ground forces, and Navy forces—is extremely important.

And finally, I would say in answer to Mr. Bates, that any particular time that mission of forces on active duty may change.

There are certain circumstances that require more air power on active duty than other circumstances.

There are other circumstances [deleted], for example, that require more Navy power on active duty than other circumstances.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well, break down how you are going to use the 150,000 men, then.

**Mr. BATES.** Well, the point I would like to make: The Secretary has said that we have increased the number of units that we have. I don't know, but I will take his word for it personally.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Bates, I understand we have a rollcall.

**Mr. GAVIN.** A yea and a nay vote.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Wait 1 minute. We will take a recess until 2 o'clock, Mr. Secretary.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Yes, sir.

**The CHAIRMAN.** And everyone please be back at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:08 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now let the committee come to order.

Members of the committee, I analyzed what Mr. Osmers sought to do this morning.

I studied it. And here is what would happen, Mr. Osmers.

Congress would lose complete control of the Reserves.

Congress controls—this is off the record.

(Further statement off the record, and further discussion off the record.)

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now we will discuss this further.

But let's go on with the hearing now.

**Mr. Secretary,** I wish you would tell the committee exactly how you would propose to implement the callup of the 150,000 reservists.

**Mr. BATES.** Mr. Chairman, are we going to complete—

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well, yes.

Pardon me, I thought you had completed.

Now go ahead, Mr. Bates.

**Mr. BATES.** I think the Secretary was enumerating different reasons why he did not believe it was necessarily advisable to increase the standing force by X number of divisions.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** No.

I was saying that we had increased the standing force very substantially, depending on what service you discuss—50 percent or 35 percent in the case of the Army and Air Force.

Secondly, that it was extremely important that increases in personnel be balanced with equipment increases and be balanced with appropriate forces in other services.

And most of the discussion this morning was associated with an increase in the Army personnel. That is low on our priority list at the moment. It is the airpower, above all else, that we need to increase.

And then the Army equipment.

And I am not foreclosing an increase in Army personnel for variety of reasons.

It may be necessary.

**Mr. BATES.** You are talking about the standing force?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** I am talking about the standing forces, exactly. And I am not foreclosing an increase in Army standing forces. But I think that this is of a lesser priority than some of the other actions we have discussed with the committee and are considering.

In any event, I don't think it is an action that need be taken now, certainly not an alternative to the resolution we are proposing this morning, but rather an action that can properly be considered again in connection with the hearings in January of next year.

But finally, I would say, in response to your point, that the balance of forces required in any particular situation will shift as the situation shifts.

And it is inconceivable to me that any acceptable increase in the standing forces would make unnecessary the continuation of reserve forces.

And therefore, I would visualize that no matter what action we take in increasing standing forces, we would still under many situations wish to come to you and ask for your authorization to call Reserves of particular types, under certain circumstances.

That is particularly the case in this situation.

[Deleted.]

**Mr. BATES.** So that—

**The CHAIRMAN.** Are you satisfied with your answer to the question as to why you should not increase the Regular Force and maintain it all times, instead of constantly having these reservists called up?

Because you recognize that we are going to live with this problem. It is going to be before us all the time.

Now if we had 1,050,000 [sic] which the Army has made some statement they needed, or if we have 1,008,000, which I tried to get

the Appropriations Committee to appropriate enough money for—if you had either one of those, would you still in this crisis think you need 150,000 reservists?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would answer "Yes," Mr. Chairman. Possibly 100,000 if we had those others, but I would say "Yes."

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Then if we had 1.2 million people, you would still in a crisis of this character feel like [deleted] you would need to call up a certain number of reservists, is that correct?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; I do feel that. [Deleted.]

Mr. BATES. That would be just as fillers?

Secretary McNAMARA. Not necessarily.

In this present case—

Mr. BATES. No. I mean if you increased it to the number he says?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. [Deleted.] So the men called under the circumstances outlined by the chairman would not necessarily be fillers only.

Mr. BATES. [Deleted.] Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.] That is correct.

Mr. BATES. Now, are we to conclude from what you have said that our policy so far as we can see down the road will be to be calling in these Reserves every time that a little tension gets aggravated throughout the world?

Secretary McNAMARA. No; definitely not.

I think it quite unlikely that we would continue to face over an extended period of time the type of crisis that we face at the present time.

Mr. BATES. Well, maybe so, but it looks to me—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute.

Do you mean that there will be declared a national emergency?

Secretary McNAMARA. No. I mean, in answer to Mr. Bates' question, that I don't believe that little crises, which I think we will continue to face indefinitely, would require the call up of Reserves. [Deleted.]

Mr. BATES. Now that is the point I have been trying to make.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. And I agree with you on that.

Mr. BATES. Now when will that time come in your present planning?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that—first let me say we are examining now in great detail the contingencies around the world that we might face and the military force requirements for those contingencies in all three services.

This is known as the general purpose force study. And this is being examined, or has been under examination, for perhaps 3 months and is being examined in great detail as a foundation for the budget that will be presented in January.

[Deleted.]

Periodically, however, there will be an accentuation of the crisis and a peaking of the crisis [deleted]. And at that point, if conflict appears imminent and the crisis appears as intense as the present one does [deleted] then under those rare circumstances I believe we would request authority to call up the Reserves.

Mr. BATES. You see, I don't see any significant difference, Mr. Secretary, between what we are experiencing right now and what we have experienced for several years. I don't see it.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think there is a considerable difference, Mr. Bates.

Mr. BATES. I don't see it.

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe there is a considerable difference between what we are experiencing today and what we have on several occasions in the past.

Mr. BATES. We have had Berlin.

Cuba is not new. We have had all southeast Asia. We had Khrushchev blow hot and blow cold. We have had Korea. We have had trouble on the borders of Tibet and the Indian border. We have had it all. Just one continual series of crises—Lebanon, Trieste, Guatemala. We have had so many of them.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think this is really a question that the State Department should be discussing rather than me.

Mr. HARDY. We had a very good answer on that one yesterday.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would say the crisis is more severe.

And I would like to have General Lemnitzer add his comments, if he disagrees with me.

The crisis today in terms of military requirements—

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General—

Secretary McNAMARA (continuing). Is more severe than at any time since the actual Korean war.

Now, Lem, you may choose to disagree with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, state that again.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would say that the crisis today in terms of military requirements and potential military operations is more severe than at any time since the actual combat operations of the Korean war.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General, have you any comment on it?

General LEMNITZER. I agree with that. [Deleted.]

Now with regard to the strength of the Regular Forces, I believe that the following considerations apply in this situation:

We have never gone through a major emergency, and particularly one in which combat was impending, with the Active Forces we have had on duty at the beginning of that emergency.

We have invariably, in the American tradition, reached into the Reserves to provide the additional force required, because that is the only source under our system of maintaining adequate trained military manpower to cope with such situations.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the reason we did that is this: because the Active Armed Forces were not large enough, and it was very small and kept small all the time.

General LEMNITZER. I would like to illustrate why a general increase of all Active Forces would not preclude the necessity for calling up some Reserves.

As the Secretary has pointed out, the problem differs in each crisis for each of the services.

[Deleted.]

Mr. GAVIN. May I ask a question at that point?

(The chairman nods.)

Mr. GAVIN. As you describe it now, we are in a rebuilding stage. Why are you choosing all these warehouses and depots and airbases and airstrips, and closing down all over the United States, when we know we are in a critical and chaotic time, when we may need these bases most any time? Why are we closing them up? Three months from now to open them all up again?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Gavin—

Mr. GAVIN. I can't understand your philosophy of trying to build and create our national defense at the same time you are cutting back and cutting back on all the facilities which are needed to build and maintain a defensive strength.

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, the program involves closing only those that are surplus to our requirements.

That is in view of either the changed nature of deployments or the changed nature of the weapons systems coming in.

We are opening a good many other areas. Take, for example, the very large missile base construction that is going on throughout this country. It is a tremendous expansion of military installations.

And the bases that are being closed are being closed because they are surplus to our requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. Now—

Mr. GAVIN. Let me finish.

Just scattered around a vast perimeter. It is questionable in my mind whether you could coordinate your strength if you got into a position that you had to move and move quick. You are scattered all over the world.

I just don't know what your policy is in building a unit that may have to move quick.

By being drawn from here, drawn from there, and drawn from everywhere, to get them into action at some particular spot, or—

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, Mr. Gavin, to have bases that we don't actually require really weakens us, because it requires the distribution of manpower in areas where they do not reach their full capability.

I would say that is generally the reason.

Mr. GAVIN. They are all experienced men, aren't they? They would be hard to replace if you had an emergency tomorrow.

Secretary McNAMARA. But the manpower moves to where they will be more useful to the armed services than they are out in some base which is not required.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Bates, your questions always have so much meat. Everybody wants to get a little bite. And I will get back to you.

Go ahead.

Mr. BATES. Then as I understand the situation, you don't think you are going to have to call these people up, No. 1?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Mr. BATES. No. 2, you do not believe that the policy of calling Reserves in and putting them out every year is a good, sound policy over the long run.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it is a very unsound policy.

**Mr. BATES.** Thirdly, you presently have under consideration plans to augment your present Standing Forces, and that will probably be in your next year's military bill?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** No, I wouldn't word No. 3 as you have.

**Mr. BATES.** Let's go over that one again.

**The CHAIRMAN.** That is what I understood you to say, Mr. Secretary.

**Mr. BATES.** That is what I got.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** No. I said we are augmenting our present forces today as I described to you.

**Mr. BATES.** Yes.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** In the case of the Air Force we are adding the 18 squadrons to tactical air. This is in process. It will yield operationally ready units over a period of months that lies ahead.

We have the authorization in terms of money and in terms of manpower to carry out that program, although the program is not yet completed.

We have underway for a period of months a complete review of all of our force levels—those we presently have authorized to us.

That review is still in process. It will be completed in time to influence the fiscal 1964 budget to be presented in January.

But I don't wish to predict today what the conclusions will be from that review. The Chiefs are working on it now, for example. They haven't finished their work and I haven't finished mine.

So I don't wish to say to you that we are planning to raise or to recommend an increase in the force levels.

**Mr. BATES.** But you—

**Secretary McNAMARA.** But I do say without qualification that it is unsound to follow a force level program for the Active Forces that requires that we have a continuing series of reserve callups to augment those forces.

Frequent and continuing series of callups are undesirable.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now—

**Mr. BATES.** I hope we don't have to go over this same ground next year.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now Mr. Slatinshek, will you please make a note of what the Secretary said, in the order, so we will have that in the record.

**Mr. SLATINSHEK.** Yes, sir.

**The CHAIRMAN.** But first, now, Mr. Bates, any more meat to bring out?

**Mr. BATES.** No, I have had enough.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Thank you, sir.

**Mr. Hébert?**

**Mr. HÉBERT.** This is following up what Mr. Bates said, Mr. Secretary.

During the recent hearings conducted by the subcommittee which I headed, various witnesses from the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army repeatedly stated that Reserve Forces would not again be recalled to active duty "unless the situation had reached the stage at which conflict had started or was clearly imminent."

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick stated during the December 14 press conference that hasty mobilization of Reserve Forces such

as we have just experienced—last month—would not be used again to meet the repeated crisis which inevitably lie ahead.

Secretary Ailes in commenting on the strength of the Active Army said "we think that the strength we have properly utilized gives us the military capability to meet recurring crises."

Formerly you, Mr. Secretary, in appearing before this committee earlier this year stated—and I quote you—

Plainly if we could bring at least selected units of the Reserve components to a high level of combat readiness, we would not need to call them to active duty until the situation had reached the point where conflict had started or war was imminent.

Now in view of these statements—and keep in mind this is important, that what I have just read is nothing in executive session and nothing secret or classified. These are public statements. The public is fully knowledgeable of them. They have been made in the hearings and have been widely publicized.

Now what position do you find yourself in now? How do you explain your position that if a callup does come—do you then mean to say that the war is imminent?

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

But I want to say right now, without any qualification whatsoever, that I would say today exactly what you have quoted me as saying earlier this year.

And your quotation was entirely correct. I have it right here. [Indicating document.]

It was during the hearings in January of this year that I made the statement I did.

"And I would say further, however, that we have met several emergencies this year without the callup of Reserves.

We sent units, that is air and ground, into Thailand. [Deleted.] We were quite uncertain as to what lay ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have already testified here that in your opinion the crisis is the most serious one since Korea.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir, that is my firm opinion.

And I think General Lemnitzer shared it.

And I believe the Chiefs as a group would.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor.

Mr. STAFFORD. The most perplexing question that I have run into personally and the most difficult question I have had to try to explain back home is why, if we are in a crisis of this nature, we let the Reserves go that we had in August, and here we are only a month later asking for authority to call up another 150,000 people.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

I think it is a very reasonable question. And the answer is this.

That the Reserves that were called up last year were called up under different circumstances.

We were quite deficient, as I have pointed out earlier today. We have since the time those Reserves were called up increased the combat-ready divisions by 45 percent. This is really a tremendous increment in combat power.

We have started, but not completed, an increase in the tactical fighter squadrons, of 35 percent. Again a tremendous increase in tactical power.

We have substantially added to the airlift, to Navy forces, and so on. You are all familiar with those.

So that the requirements of our military forces today for reservists, particularly for those that were called up a year ago, are different than they were a year ago.

And, therefore, it seemed possible to deactivate those forces.

And I think if we had to make the decision all over again we would take exactly the same action and timing of deactivation.

Secondly, I think it only reasonable and right that the burden of serving in the Active Forces be distributed as equitably as possible and as evenly as possible among the Reserves.

And for that reason it would have been wise, I think, if for no other, to substitute new Reserve Forces for old Reserve Forces on active duty.

And finally, there is a third reason, and that is that we aren't certain and as a matter of fact I believe the probability today is we will not call up forces under the authority of this resolution.

And we think it unwise to keep on active duty Reserve Forces that may not be needed.

So, for all three reasons, I think our action was correct.

Mr. RIVERS. Let me ask one question.

Will you yield?

Mr. STAFFORD. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. RIVERS. How do you think we ought to do this?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe the Congress——

Mr. RIVERS. Now remember my question.

What do you think we should do?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe the Congress should grant the authority requested in this resolution.

Mr. RIVERS. Wait now. And leave the discretion--because you don't know whether you are going to need it or not, do you?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct. And I think--within the limits of the authority, the discretion should be left with the Executive power.

Mr. RIVERS. Now, what about the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba?

The CHAIRMAN. We will get to that.

Mr. RIVERS. Wait a minute. I want to find out about this. Because this is uppermost.

You have to face questions and you have to face realities of life.

Now what do you think?

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, the chairman may wish to——

Mr. RIVERS. Wait a minute now——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute.

Mr. RIVERS. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hardy——

Mr. RIVERS. I won't pursue it further, than——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I think we will want to go into that before we are through with that.

The CHAIRMAN. We will get into that.

Mr. HARDY. But I want to follow up on the statement the Secretary just made.

[Deleted.]

**We can overrespond to certain situations.**

I think it would be an overresponse, it would be an action that weakens the Nation, if we declared a national emergency today, upset our people, caused runs on stocks in the stores, cautioned them to fear that the economy, the domestic economy would be placed under the type of controls that were in effect during the Korean period, and they in turn anticipated those and almost forced the controls.

This is the kind of action that would be an overresponse and could weaken us rather than help us as a nation. And this is why we are not recommending that kind of action.

**Mr. STRATTON.** Mr. Chairman?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, 1 minute.

I think in view of the fact—now I want to have something read, which I will lay before you for the time being, and get the Secretary's comment.

I think that this resolution should carry something along a line that I am going to ask Mr. Slatinshek to read.

And I want to get a comment from the Secretary on it, without any commitment from anyone or anything about it.

But I do want to get back. And I think it is pertinent to put it in writing at this point.

But I do want to get back, to demonstrate by the Secretary that the [deleted].

Is that correct?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now read this. And I want to lay this before us. We are going to think all this out. And here is what is running through my mind now. And that is a possible addition into this resolution.

Now listen.

**Mr. SLATINSHEK (reading):**

Whereas President James Monroe announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared to the Congress that we should consider new attempts on the part of European powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety;

Whereas in the Rio treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that an armed attack by any state against an American State shall be considered as attack against all the American States and consequently each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Whereas, the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January declared "the present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extra-continental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union";

Whereas since 1958 the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence; Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Congress that the President of the United States is supported in his determination and possesses all necessary authority—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Castro regime from exporting its aggressive purposes to any part of this hemisphere by force or the threat of force;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military base capable of endangering the United States Naval

Base at Guantanamo, free passage to the Panama Canal, U.S. missile and space preparations, or the security of this Nation and its citizens; and

(c) to work with other free citizens of this hemisphere and with freedom-loving Cuban refugees to support the legitimate aspirations of the people of Cuba for a return to self-determination.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I am going to at the proper time open this up for debate.

But if any of you have any questions along this line, it is all right.

But I do want to get back and try to justify, outside of Cuba, the importance of this resolution.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. RIVERS. Wait now.

Have you read this?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir. I have just heard it read.

I don't have a copy.

Mr. RIVERS. Wait a second, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't have a copy, Mr. Rivers.

Mr. RIVERS. I want to be sure that you read this, and to see whether or not you agree with this.

Secretary McNAMARA. I do agree with it.

Mr. RIVERS. And whatever additions you may have in connection with this?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do agree with it. I don't mean I agree with every word of it, because this is an important document.

You will wish to consider the words very carefully. But as to principle I agree with it.

Mr. BATES. Whoever the author of it is, I wonder if he would explain what it means.

Mr. PHILBIN. Will you yield?

Mr. RIVERS. Certainly.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the views of the chairman and the members of the committee concerning the germaneness of the proposed amendment.

It does not seem to me from what I heard read that the material in the proposed amendment was at all germane to the resolution under consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—

Mr. PHILBIN. It seems to me that that calls for a very high level State Department, diplomatic interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—

Mr. PHILBIN. That is far beyond the purview of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't agree with you about the purview of this committee.

I think it has jurisdiction relating to anything on the defense of the country.

Now I want to put this before you. We will work it out. I want to let you know what is being considered.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question on this point, and following up what Mr. Hardy had said.

We had a briefing yesterday, Mr. Secretary, and I think almost every member of this committee expressed some concern that we might not be doing enough, that we might be letting the Cubans go beyond

the particular line and we were not responding, we were not implementing the Monroe Doctrine. [Deleted.]

Now, do I understand that one of the reasons why you are requesting this authority is that in the event, over the next few weeks, that we should be required to do something of this kind, there are only two ways, militarily, that we could be prepared for this kind of a decision on the part of the Executive.

One would be to continue with our present force, with no change, or else we would order a total mobilization, and that what you are trying to suggest to us in this legislation is some kind of middle way that would make it possible to respond without either doing nothing or going all the way, as Mr. Hardy has suggested.

Is this a fair interpretation of what is in your mind?

[Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't believe that one of the two alternatives we have today is either to continue with the present forces or mobilize all the reserves.

I would rephrase that second alternative slightly to say:

Declare a national emergency and call such reserves as were needed, which is not quite the same thing as mobilize all the reserves.

But with that qualification, I would agree with you, that those are the two alternatives we have, unless some legislation of this type is passed.

And this legislation provides a third alternative, which is to call certain reserves without the effect of declaring a national emergency.

Mr. RIVERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. May I just follow this thought—

Secretary McNAMARA. May I just add one clause, and say, beyond, that this legislation gives us the right to extend tours of duty in the Army and the Air Force, which rights we do not have under the powers the President would obtain following declaration of a national emergency.

So that in itself is a technical point, but a very important advantage to this legislation.

And if I may say just one further point?

This legislation is not directed solely or primarily at the problem of Cuba.

Mr. STRATTON. Well, that may be, Mr. Secretary.

But I think the thing that disturbed all of us yesterday was the fact that we are confronted with this situation in Cuba at the same time that we have the situation in Berlin.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. STRATTON. And that the interplay of these two could present us with a very serious problem.

And to me, I find it a little bit hard to have some members be critical of our calling any reserves to duty when yesterday the consensus was that we, as the American people, wanted to do a lot more than was being done in the nature of getting back at Mr. Castro.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. You stated it very well.

Now Mr. Pirnie.

Mr. RIVERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield—

**The CHAIRMAN.** Wait a minute.

**Mr. Gavin.**

**Mr. GAVIN.** I wonder what the Secretary thinks of attaching a resolution with these sentiments to a bill of this kind?

What psychological effect do you think it will have on the people of the world when we tie these two in together—calling up 150,000 troops and adding the statement relative to the Cuban situation?

What do you think people are going to think?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** I believe that the people of this country will recognize that the authority to call reserves is related not solely to Cuba but to the world situation.

The President clearly stated this in his statement.

I have tried to state it very clearly, both publicly and before the committees of Congress.

So I don't think there will be misunderstanding on that point.

**Mr. RIVERS.** Will the gentleman yield at that point?

**Mr. GAVIN.** Yes; I will yield.

**Mr. RIVERS.** [Deleted.]

**Mr. GAVIN.** Certainly you can't call up 150,000 more troops with your standing Army and then express sentiments like we have expressed in this statement here and not have the people figuring what it is all about.

I would like to know whether or not you think it is appropriate to put that statement in with this resolution to increase the troop strength.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** I think this is entirely a question for the committee to decide.

It could be handled separately or as part of the resolution.

I think in view of the sentiments that have been expressed in the committee, it is quite appropriate to include such a series of statements in the resolution associated with the Reserve and guard callup.

**Mr. GAVIN.** I didn't get the last part.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** I think it is quite appropriate that such statements be associated with the Reserve and guard callup.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Purnie.

**Mr. PIRNIE.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am concerned, Mr. Secretary, with this particular thought. For some time I have had the impression that much of our military effort was devoted toward meeting the threats as they presented themselves around the world; in other words, meeting the test that somebody else subjected us to, without having a definite objective on our own part which provided an adequate level to enforce our rights.

And when we have indulged in discussions such as we did yesterday as to whether something is worth fighting for, I am reminded that individually one item might not seem to justify war but collectively it certainly does justly decisive action.

We find ourselves passing on debts to our children, and perhaps we are passing on too many problems.

And I wonder whether we wouldn't be doing a great service if we gave you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff what you felt was required in order for you to take a firm position when you thought we were in danger anywhere, so that we could ask to have that situation either receded, corrected, or removed.

That is why I feel that you are placed in a very difficult position trying to anticipate military needs if it is purely to cope with crises arising here or there.

But if you could have a definite, positive program that gave us, or the command of the Joint Chiefs, a military strength that would permit us to stand firm and saw that they would either correct the situation or remove it, we would feel happy. And that is what we would like to give you.

I don't know whether I made my point clear. But it seems we are living from crisis to crisis without an affirmative program of our own.

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe we have an affirmative program.

And I believe that the authority we have requested when added to the actual strength we have will permit us to meet the situations that lie ahead of us between now and the time that Congress is likely to come back into session.

I fully concur with the chairman's emphasis upon the responsibility of Congress and the authority of Congress to guide and maintain a close control over the use of Reserve forces.

And I don't believe we either need nor do I consider it appropriate that we be given blanket authority to call up Reserve forces.

Mr. PIRNIE. I quite agree with that, Mr. Secretary. And I feel that that is important.

But I have been wondering what the estimate of the danger was, from the viewpoint of the Chiefs of Staff, of the buildup in Cuba. Because I think some of us relate our thinking to the estimate that they would place upon what is occurring there.

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, I would like to answer that. And then I would like General Lemnitzer to answer it.

I would say that the buildup in Cuba militarily and particularly that buildup that has occurred in the last 4 to 6 weeks is not by itself a factor that greatly influences our force requirements, but that taken in association with the other actions in the world, it presents us with a total world situation that definitely requires the kind of resolution that we are presenting here today.

Now, I want to go back over that and emphasize it.

I have said that the military buildup in Cuba that has occurred in recent weeks, substantial though it has been in terms of tonnage, substantial though it has been in terms of percentage increases in Cuban military capabilities, is still very, very small in relation to our military strength today, and therefore by itself has little effect upon our force requirements.

But that as an indication of the conflict between the Communist bloc on the one hand and the Western World on the other, it is very important.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rivers.

Mr. RIVERS. I have never seen a Secretary use words—these words which you said to us today, Mr. Secretary, are very valuable.

Now ask what you need, and we will give it to you.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. RIVERS. Because your words right now to me are very vital.

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, I have tried to speak very frankly.

**The CHAIRMAN.** That is right.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** I must clear this record before it goes to the public.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Oh, yes.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** But I tried to speak very frankly and not in any way color my statements to the committee.

**Mr. GAVIN.** Mr. Secretary—

**The CHAIRMAN.** Members, we will get through in a minute.

**Mr. GAVIN.** Just a very brief statement—

**The CHAIRMAN.** Nobody leave, please.

**Mr. GAVIN.** I just want to state to the Secretary: I believe that the statement made by the chairman should be incorporated in this resolution.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, Dr. Hall.

Everybody bear with this, gentlemen.

**Mr. HALL.** I can say my part very quickly.

[Deleted.]

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, thank you very much, Doctor.

Now any questions from any members of the committee?

**Mr. PIKE.** Mr. Chairman.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Pike.

**Mr. HALL.** I would like to hear from the Chief of Staff.

**The CHAIRMAN.** We are going to get to him in a minute.

**Mr. HALL.** Can't we come back?

**Mr. PIKE.** Can't we go answer that quorum call and come back?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Is there a quorum on?

(Chorus of "Yes.")

**Mr. PIKE.** It is the second bell.

**The CHAIRMAN.** I will tell you what to do, then.

We will take a recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, September 14, 1962.)

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

*Washington, D.C., Friday, September 14, 1962.*

The committee met at 10:08 a.m., Hon. Carl Vinson (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Will the committee come to order.

A quorum is present.

**Mr. Secretary,** have you any further statement to make to the committee with reference to the joint resolution under consideration?

**FURTHER STATEMENT OF SECRETARY McNAMARA**

**Secretary McNAMARA.** No, sir, I do not.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Any questions?

**Mr. PIKE.** Mr. Chairman?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Pike.

**Mr. PIKE.** Mr. Chairman. I had the floor when we adjourned yesterday, and I wanted to ask the Secretary one question.

I would like to know this: Have any plans been made for the putting or placing of additional naval or marine forces at our base at Guantanamo Bay, and does our present treaty arrangement allow us to place additional forces at Guantanamo Bay?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Mr. Pike, may I go back to a statement perhaps I did not make clear yesterday...

I did not mean to imply we have not made plans. We have plans covering all likely contingencies.

**Mr. PIKE.** I am glad to hear it.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Secondly, our treaty does allow us to reinforce Guantanamo. As to whether that is desirable, perhaps General Lemnitzer could speak more authoritatively than I.

**The CHAIRMAN.** General, what have you to say?

**General LEMNITZER.** [Deleted.]

**The CHAIRMAN.** You are ready if it becomes necessary?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** That is correct.

**Mr. CLANCY.** Mr. Chairman, could I ask him a question?

**Mr. PIKE.** Mr. Chairman.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Go ahead, Mr. Pike.

**Mr. PIKE.** I would just like to say this: Don't you think that the placing of additional Marines at Guantanamo Bay, while it could not be considered an act of war such as a blockade may be, would show determination to exactly the same extent that their moves in Cuba have shown and might help us in our Berlin situation?

**General LEMNITZER.** [Deleted.]

**Mr. PIKE.** Thank you.

**Mr. HARDY.** Mr. Chairman!

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Hardy.

**Mr. HARDY.** I am going to want to ask, Mr. Chairman, the question that I put to Secretary Rusk the other day, which follows along the question that Mr. Pike has been exploring and for which I did not get a satisfactory answer from Secretary Rusk. And that has to do with the point at which we would take affirmative action.

But a lot of people are exercised about this thing as to whether or not we are going to show?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Going to what?

**Mr. HARDY.** Going to show a determination to take an affirmative action to prevent a buildup that could get out of hand, and actually cause some rather serious damage and some casualties.

Have we determined the point at which we will initiate action, or are you just going to sit supinely by and let the rest of the world think we haven't any guts?

That is the question.

**The CHAIRMAN.** General, can you and the Secretary make any comment to Mr. Hardy's question?

**General LEMNITZER.** No, sir; I would say that is a matter to be determined by the President based upon developments in the situation. I don't believe you can spell out a formula that is going to prescribe exactly when you are going to make such a move. I just can't conceive of it.

**Mr. HARDY.** In other words, we will wait until they make an aggressive act?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Wait until what?

**General LEMNITZER.** No; I would not say that.

**Mr. HARDY.** I think the President expressed the view at the press conference yesterday, which indicates the—

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well, Mr. Hardy, no one but the President can determine that, and the facts would have to develop.

I think the answer of the general is correct. You can't map out a formula. But we know one thing. We know the determination of the President has been expressed by him in his interviews and in his public statements.

**Mr. HARDY.** Yes. I am familiar with those, Mr. Chairman.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Then, when any man says when conditions arise I will act, you have to have confidence in him. And, of course, the country knows the President is going to defend it. And we are not going to sit quietly by and permit the Monroe Doctrine—permit a buildup to take place that is going to jeopardize our freedom. And we have to—you just can't map it out mathematically as to what event happens that will cause you to make a positive decision.

**Mr. HARDY.** I am afraid that is correct.

**Mr. PHILBIN.** Will the gentleman yield?

**Mr. HARDY.** I certainly do not pose as an authority in this field.

**Mr. PHILBIN.** I want to say that I am entirely in agreement with what the chairman has to say, and I will go farther and say this: The determination of policy and strategy is not for this committee.

**The CHAIRMAN.** That is right.

You are dead right.

**Mr. CLANCY.** Mr. Chairman?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Everybody is going to have a chance.

**Mr. CLANCY.** I want to ask one question.

Do we have sufficient facilities to provide for additional men and ships at Guantanamo at this particular time?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** Yes; without question we do.

**Mr. CLANCY.** We could provide for the additional movement of troops in there and also of ships.

**Secretary McNAMARA.** We can indeed.

**Mr. CLANCY.** Thank you.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, Mr. Bennett, any comments?

**Mr. BENNETT.** Yes, I would like to ask one question if I might. Apparently there are some matters we have discussed with you, Mr. Secretary, that have to do with the functions of the State Department and the President rather than with this committee or even with the Department of Defense, and it is not my purpose to go into these.

But I think you can pretty well see that Congress and the country are anxious to make some assertion of great determination at this point so that we will not be led into a war because of miscalculation on the part of Khrushchev that this country is not determined.

Now some questions were already asked you along this line and suggestions were made. And we could make the suggestion, for instance, of perhaps having this committee raise 150,000 to 200,000, or we could remove the date that has been suggested by Mr. Osmers, and the other suggestions he has made, or we might make some ref-

erence to the guards or something like that. Something in this resolution, perhaps, could be added, which would be an indication to the country and to the world that the Armed Services Committee wished to give whatever appropriate additional strength might be given to the defense of our country at this time, and it might be a healthy factor that it came from the Congress rather than from the Executive in the initial aspects.

So my question to you is this: Do you have a suggestion as to anything which we could add to this resolution which would be an indication of Congress determination and the determination of the country, without hurting the purposes of this resolution?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Bennett, I don't have any such suggestion.

I don't believe it is necessary.

I think that the intent of Congress to support the administration's determination to remain firm in the negotiations over Berlin and in opposing Communist aggression wherever it may occur in the world can be demonstrated by prompt action on the resolution, by unanimous action on the resolution, and by the statements made in support of the resolution, rather than my changing the resolution itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Doyle?

Mr. DOYLE. [Deleted.]

In other words, are we prepared [deleted] assuming that the necessity might come any time, or is there some major lack in our readiness which would make you feel we are not ready [deleted]?

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

But whatever shortages exist have been identified and recognized to the extent that they can be eliminated.

We have presented budgets to Congress to obtain the funds to eliminate them on a practical basis. To the extent that these budgets will not eliminate them because of shortage of time, long leadtime required, or for any other reasons, the potential effect of those shortages has been considered. And on balance I would say we definitely are ready for whatever potential military operations may lie ahead of us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Now members of the committee—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Bray?

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to be waving the flag of war or be critical, unduly so.

But this is the situation—and I believe if you could read the mail that is coming in to the Congressmen, you would be well aware of what I am about to say.

The American people are very disturbed and unhappy. They have given, under the keeping of the executive department, the most powerful economic force by far that ever existed in the world, and also the greatest military force.

The American people are giving that without scarcely a question. I believe that the last appropriation bill which passed this House was the largest it has ever been in peacetime. I think it passed it unanimously, as I recall.

But under the Constitution, only one man can use that force to restore the morale and spiritual strength of yesterday. No question it is lower. I am not saying who is to blame.

And I think the people of America want some say here beyond just the talking to Khrushchev. Because recent publications have revived, again, the incidents that happened when the second air strike was called off at the Bay of Pigs.

I don't want to vote for a resolution adding anything to this that is against the policy of the Department of Defense.

But as someone asked you a moment ago, or mentioned to you, I think it would be very fine if you just suggested something to go just a little beyond—I will not say "eyewash," but, oh, the giving of philosophical ideas.

Because, frankly, the American people are through with that, if I can judge from my mail. Three-fourths of my mail is bitter. And frankly some of it is the fault of Congress for doing nothing about this encroachment on America and being insulted every day by a guttersnipe of the type of Castro.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bray, we have something that follows up along that line. You were not here yesterday.

Mr. BRAY. No; I was not here. That is the reason I wanted to make the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I will explain it to the committee just as soon as—

Mr. BRAY. Is that for committee action now, or is it something else?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is a resolution dealing with the subject matter that is going to come up on the floor immediately after this bill is considered on the floor.

It is relating to it.

Mr. BRAY. Why couldn't it be in the legislation?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, simply for the reason it would not be proper because it would emphasize the Cuban situation. [Deleted.]

But we have enough about Cuba in the resolution.

Now just as soon as I can—but first, I want to recognize every member.

Mr. Gubser—

(Addressing Mr. Bray:)

Have you read it? Read this resolution. [Hands.]

The CHAIRMAN. It has been introduced. I introduced it yesterday. Mr. Morgan and others have introduced the resolution.

It was introduced after Mr. Morgan took the floor yesterday afternoon. Dr. Hall and myself were on the floor.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question on that?

Mr. GUBSER. I believe—oh, it is on that?

(Mr. Kowalski nods.)

Mr. GUBSER. I yield.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Yes, just to clear that point up.

Is it intended to be part of this other resolution or is it a separate resolution?

The CHAIRMAN. No; it is a separate matter.

Mr. KOWALSKI. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is entirely separate, but they probably are going to come up one right after the other.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Secretary, I don't even want to discuss who made the decision to call off the second air strike at the Bay of Pigs.

But I merely bring it up to delineate the type of situation that I am going to ask about.

I would like to know what steps if any have been taken to assure that a strictly military decision will be made once our military force has been committed by the civilian authorities—that a strictly military decision will be made by consultation with military people?

Secretary McNAMARA. The President as Commander in Chief has a close relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are his legal military advisers. He uses them as such.

Mr. GUBSER. You would anticipate then that if a similar situation, and not referring specifically to that one—but if a hypothetical situation like that second air strike came up, that the Joint Chiefs would be consulted?

Secretary McNAMARA. The President has made that very clear.

Mr. GUBSER. All right.

Secretary McNAMARA. That he relies upon the Joint Chiefs as his military advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, members of the committee—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, we have some more here.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Becker?

Mr. BECKER. [Deleted.] Why are we not stepping up our selective service and putting in another 150,000 or 200,000 and training them over these 3 to 4 months?

They would be far advanced and we would have them there for 2 years. Rather than disrupting the lives, again, of 150,000 reservists, as we did with the other 140,000 or 50,000 (sic).

I don't think anyone, and I know, I can't see why we can't do the other and do it on a sound and a prolonged basis, rather than this temporary crisis all the time, that certainly has our country in the jitters. I know they are in my area, and I am sure there is mail coming in from all over.

It is a creation of the jitters. I frankly don't think it is good for the morale of our Nation. I don't think it is good for the morale of these reservists, to be in this constant position of never knowing for what period they are going to be called up and for what purpose.

I think they are there. I think they are ready. But it would seem to me it would be much more practical, even if it costs a little more money. I have never once voted against appropriation for any of these purposes of national defense. Never have once; nor have I criticized it.

But to me it would seem so much more practical, sounder and would fortify us a great deal more into the future, I think it would be much sounder. Why couldn't we do that?

Secretary McNAMARA. We agree that the Active Forces should be built to a higher level of combat readiness and combat capability.

And as I mentioned yesterday, an action has been taken to increase the Army by roughly 45 percent in combat strength above the levels of a year ago.

The Air Force is undergoing, but has not completed—and this I think is critical in connection with the proposed resolution—an increase of about 35 percent in their tactical fighter squadrons.

No amount of increase in selective service today would accelerate the combat readiness or availability of the additional squadrons that are being activated and trained. At least until that date when they will be combat ready, the type of authority that we are requesting can be of great value to us in the face of some of the situations we face for the future.

Mr. BECKER. I am in agreement with what you say, Mr. Secretary.

But we are only granting authority in this to call these men up, but it may not be necessary.

Secretary McNAMARA. It may not be.

Mr. BECKER. But concurrently why couldn't we not step up the draft and then have the numbers preparatory, in advance? So if this Reserve authority is not needed, we would then have the manpower trained to do the job that you want done.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of air units—

Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNAMARA. Speaking of air units in contrast to ground units, in a very real sense that is exactly what we are doing.

We do not fill the air units with draftees.

We do with voluntary recruitment. We have increased our recruitment in the Air Force.

The strength of the Air Force has risen by, I have forgotten the exact number, but it is on the order of 40,000 or 50,000 men over the past several months.

A portion of these men are being assigned to the new fighter units that are being created. We lacked in that instance not only men but also aircraft.

We have assigned to the Active Forces from the National Guard certain of the aircraft previously assigned to the Guard. I am speaking of aircraft now and not people.

And the combination of those aircraft transferred from the Guard—there have been as I recall in the order of 200 aircraft transferred from the Guard to the Active Forces, plus the increased recruitment of the Air Force—are the materials from which the Air Force is creating these new squadrons.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I hope that you can find some justification to follow the views of the committee in its hopes that you will strengthen all three of the services in its personnel.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is a good deal in what Mr. Becker says. We will try to work that out when we meet again next January.

I do think that we could avoid instances like this probably if we build up probably 150,000 or 250,000 or whatever you need.

We might avoid it.

Mr. Chamberlain?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have just two quick questions.

Some of my Coast Guard friends have approached me and inquired whether or not their omission in this bill—whether or not you considered—let me state it this way.

Am I correct in assuming that their not appearing here would indicate that you have considered this and felt it is not necessary to include the Coast Guard Reserve in this resolution?

Secretary McNAMARA. We do not consider it is necessary to include the Coast Guard Reserve.

Not because we don't have high regard for the Coast Guard Reserve, but under the circumstances we visualize facing during the period Congress is out of session it does not appear necessary to call up the Coast Guard Reserve.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Thank you. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Now—

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. My second question is, Mr. Chairman: During our Reserve hearings that we just completed, which was a matter of a month or 2 or 3 months ago, you people were here with the suggestion that we cut our Reserve force some 58,000.

Now I am wondering whether or not, in the light of the current need for the Reserves here, that you are taking measures to implement your 150,000 of these reservists or whether or not you are reconsidering the advisability of this cut that you have recommended.

Secretary McNAMARA. We stated to Congress on several occasions and in the form of a letter which I addressed to the chairman of the appropriate committees that we would program the strength of 700,000 men, the funds for which Congress appropriated, for the National Guard and for the Reserve Forces and would endeavor to build to that strength with, however, certain qualifications.

First, that we would apply the same recruiting standards to the Reserve and the Guard that we applied in the instance of the Army to the Active Army recruitment.

This has not been done in the past. The standards in certain circumstances for the Reserve and the Guard have been lowered below the standards for the Army in an effort to meet designated strength targets.

Secondly, we would insist that the men assigned to units; that is, recruited to and assigned to units in the Reserve and the Guard be assigned in relation to their abilities and in relation to the military occupation specialties required by their units.

This has not been done in the past, again this order to fill certain predetermined strength objectives.

These military occupational specialty requirements have been relaxed and the result has been that we have had Reserve and Guard units poorly staffed with men poorly qualified.

Thirdly, we stated that we would insist that units with required readiness objectives and, therefore, certain authorized strength be brought to those strengths, or if it proved impossible to bring those units to those strengths, we would shift the readiness objective and the level of training and equipment to some other units that had a capability to meet those strength objectives.

Similarly, we would not allow units to be raised above authorized strength levels in order to offset shortages in other units. Because by so doing we fail to achieve the readiness of the total force.

With these qualifications, we are seeking to meet the strength 700,000 units described by Congress and for which funds were appropriated.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, members of the committee—

Mr. STRATTON. May I ask just one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. [Deleted.] I wondered whether you as the Secretary of Defense, and General Lemnitzer, also, agreed with that distinction, that this was a defensive rather than an offensive buildup.

In the first place, these weapons, as members of the committee pointed out at the time, could well be used offensively as well as defensively, and secondly, it does seem to me that we are overlooking the fact that the longer this kind of buildup continues, whether it be called defensive or offensive, the harder it is for us to react when we decide to react and the more difficult becomes the position of our base at Guantanamo.

Mr. Hanson Baldwin's article in the New York Times pointed this out this morning.

I wonder if you take that position, Mr. Secretary, and if General Lemnitzer does, that this is a purely defensive buildup and therefore is not as significant as a so-called offensive buildup might be?

Secretary McNAMARA. Most military weapons have both an offensive and a defensive capability, in the single pieces of hardware. Certainly that is true of a rifle. I would think it would be true of most kinds of airplanes. It would be true of torpedo boats, for example.

It would be true of almost any single piece of military hardware.

There are certain exceptions.

But in any normal use of the words "defensive" and "offensive" capabilities as they are normally defined, it seems clear to me that the action in Cuba to date has been of a defensive character.

The CHAIRMAN. Now—

Secretary McNAMARA. And I say this in large part because of the relative size of the forces.

Mr. STRATTON. Couldn't it complicate our ability to respond when we do decide to respond?

We have been talking about where we were going to draw the line. We have been talking about when we were going to do something.

Don't you recognize that the longer we let this kind of thing go on, whether you call it defensive or offensive, the more difficult becomes our response, if, as, and when we decide to make one.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; I think a larger defense is more of a problem than a smaller defense. And their defense has increased.

But I think one must examine the increase in relation to our military capabilities and the increase has been very small in relation to our capabilities.

I am not seeking—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, members of the committee, it is necessary to consider these amendments.

Now I offer the suggestion that we amend this bill exactly like the Senate unanimously passed it yesterday.

Now the first amendment would be, on page 1, lines 3 and 4, strike out "January 31" and insert "February 28" in lieu thereof.

~~Mr.~~ BATES. February 20 or 28?

THE CHAIRMAN. The 28th.

Mr. PHILBIN. The 28th.

The CHAIRMAN. February 28.

On page 1, beginning—the Secretary explained all these yesterday. On page 1, beginning on line 5, strike out “and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in” and insert “or any member, of” in lieu thereof.

And the next amendment: On page 2, line 4, strike out “January” and insert “February 28” in lieu thereof.

On page 2, line 17, after the word “duty,” insert “or whose period active duty was extended”.

On page 2, strike out lines 20 and 21.

Now that makes this bill correspond exactly with the Senate bill.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman?

I would like to ask one question.

Here you say “any member of the Ready Reserve.”

Does that include individuals of the National Guard unit?

Secretary McNAMARA. I could not hear your question, Mr. Bray.

Mr. BRAY. Here on line 7 you say “or any member of the Ready Reserve of an armed force.”

Does that mean that you can call John Smith of B Company of the 1st Infantry?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; yes, it does.

Mr. BRAY. That has never been done before. I am pretty sure of that.

It has been in the organized Reserve, but never in the Guard.

And there are reasons why you can very quickly decimate a unit, or a company, that was a part of a battalion and you could destroy the entire character of it.

Now you have done that in the Reserve in the past.

I think it is something that should be taken very careful thought of before you do that to an organized unit.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Bray, this subject was discussed yesterday.

I completely agree with you.

We did not propose this change. It was proposed in the Senate.

We stated we accepted it because it does increase our flexibility of action, but we stated that if the change is approved we would use the authority but sparingly.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. BRAY. I question whether they understand the problem there—and maybe I should not say that about the other body—or they would not have done that.

And if you do not need it, it should not be in. If you do need it, you are starting a chain reaction that can defeat the very purpose in which you are doing this.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Bray, in view of the Secretary's statement, it only adds flexibility to do it.

But from his statement you know he is not going to do it.

Mr. BRAY. Then why put it in there?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well, because it is already in there and the Senate signed it and otherwise we will have to have a long fuss about it in conference.

And when we have the assurance of the Secretary how he is going to administer it—

**Mr. BRAY.** Is that only to apply to the tactical Air Force?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** No; as the resolution is written it applies to all of the forces.

But my statement that if it is included we would use the authority only sparingly applies to all the forces.

**The CHAIRMAN.** The Secretary says he agrees with your statement. The whole committee agrees with your statement.

It is going to be very carefully done.

**Mr. BRAY.** Why do something we know is wrong—

**The CHAIRMAN.** No—

**Mr. OSMERS.** Mr. Chairman?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Osmers.

**Mr. OSMERS.** I am going to support the resolution.

And my only purpose now in asking for the attention of the committee is that I believe yesterday the discussion that we had about a suggestion of mine was off the record.

And I merely wanted to say it because references have been made since then as to what I said.

So in order for that to show up intelligently in the record, I would like to say I believe the Nation is facing a grave crisis, and while I support this resolution I would also support a resolution which would place no restriction upon it.

**The CHAIRMAN.** That is right.

**Mr. OSMERS.** Thank you.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, members of the committee—

**Mr. GUBSER.** One quick question—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

**Mr. COHELAN.** I have one quick question, Mr. Chairman, in connection with this Reserve matter.

**Mr. Secretary,** I am wondering if you do use this authority, what is the impact going to be on the men on active duty?

Now when I was out in Korea last year there was an awful lot of beefs about this business of the extensions.

Now we must know how many men are going to be hit by that in this particular period. How many do you think there will be?

**Secretary McNAMARA.** The experience during the last callup was that a relatively large number of men faced an extension of their tour of duty, but for very short periods of time, ranging from 30 to 120 days.

There were a few cases longer than that. But relatively short period of time.

I would anticipate a somewhat similar situation this time, except that while the extensions would be for relatively short periods of time the number of men involved would be very much smaller than the last time.

I cannot give you any exact figures.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, members of the committee—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

**Mr. GUBSER.** Mr. Chairman, this won't take a second—

Mr. COHELAN. May I express the hope, Mr. Secretary, that you are going to interpret this very carefully and more or less favor the fellow who has been on active duty?

Because that seems to me to be a tremendous burden, particularly if the situation corresponds roughly to the previous kind of emergency.

Secretary McNAMARA. I fully support that policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Gubser.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the Secretary if section 3 were not a part of this resolution, could you not by administrative determination refrain from calling up some of these men that have already served?

Could you not accomplish this by administrative decision, rather than having it written in here?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; I believe we could.

Mr. GUBSER. I don't want to pursue it.

Secretary McNAMARA. But I think it is essential we tell the men that they won't be called.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, members of the committee, everyone understands these amendments.

And without objection, the amendments are agreed to.

Now before I am asking for a vote, I want to make this statement to the committee—

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, we have to vote for it, but I do want to say that I am against this.

And if they administer this Reserve program as a lot of others, it will do irreparable [sic] harm.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, if you go to breaking up the units in the Army National Guard, why we will have to have a talk up here. [Laughter.]

We are backing the Army National Guard. We are not going to sit quietly by and permit these units to be broken up and for individuals to be plucked out of the units.

You pluck them out from the pool.

Leave our National Guards alone.

Because, you see, Mr. Secretary, the National Guard is a State organization and you would have to call, individually, a man.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And put him in the U.S. National Guard [sic], because Uncle Sam could put his hand on him, don't you see.

So, Mr. Bray, we are in your corner on this.

Mr. BRAY. I am not so sure about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, members of the committee, let me read this.

Yesterday while we were having the hearing I laid before you a statement on Cuba that I was hoping might be worked out to go in this bill.

The proposed concurrent resolution was read. And everyone is familiar with it.

The parliamentary situation is such that if this was incorporated in it, why we do not know where we would be. And after consultation with the staff and Mr. Deschler and the Speaker, and the President, we decided that the proper way to handle this matter was in two resolutions.

This resolution with reference to calling up the Reserve: that that could come up under a suspension of the rules Monday. And immediately thereafter, Concurrent Resolution 528 relating to Cuba could be brought up by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

And Mr. Morgan on the floor yesterday afternoon stated that. The Speaker stated it.

So that is the plan.

Now I want Mr. Slatinshek to read the resolving part of the resolution, that the Foreign Affairs Committee is going to bring up immediately after this.

And they tie in with reference to the firmness of our position, but do not tie into the language of the resolution we are considering.

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that House Joint Resolution 876 is coming up Monday?

Mr. PHILBIN. This is the Morgan resolution?

The CHAIRMAN. This is the Morgan-Mansfield-Vinson resolution.

Mr. PHILBIN. Fine.

The CHAIRMAN. All of us introduced it yesterday. And it is introduced in the Senate and will come up in the Senate for debate on Thursday.

And this is the way—now read the resolving clause. A copy of it is on everybody's desk.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Beginning on—

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman?

May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GAVIN. There will be no record votes on Monday or Tuesday?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if a record vote is called for on this resolution to call up the Reserves, it will have to go over until Thursday.

The same thing is true with reference to the other resolution.

I am hoping to get unanimous consent to call this up and pass it without a rollcall. But if a rollcall is demanded, it goes over until Thursday.

Mr. GAVIN. That is on both resolutions?

The CHAIRMAN. Both resolutions.

Now everybody understands it—

Mr. GAVIN. So we that have to be away on Monday won't be put in the position of—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman".)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, why not bring this out under a rule?

(Further chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. HALL. I am asking for information. I am not arguing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is the way the leadership thinks it should be handled.

I think this matter is so urgent we had better do it this way.

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. GUBSER. Forty minutes to debate 150,000 men's lives?

That is no way to run a ball game.

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a question.

Is it the intention to bring Resolution 876 up under the suspension of the rules Monday?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. BECKER. I think that is improper.

I think we ought to bring it up under the rules and with the opportunity for discussion. You have no time to discuss it under suspension of the rules.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the issue will be cleancut, whether it is up or down.

And everybody—the Senate yesterday unanimously approved this resolution.

Mr. BECKER. We don't have to be in the position of approving it in the fashion of the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. We know it.

But the leadership on both sides of the aisle are in complete harmony with the procedure and how to handle this matter.

Mr. GUBSER. But, Mr. Chairman, the leadership ought to know that we are responsible men and women. And we certainly are not going to do any harm to our country nor to say anything that the leadership need be ashamed of.

But we do not need to gag the House of Representatives on 40 minutes debate on a thing of this kind.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Read the revolving part by the House—

Mr. GAVIN. Let me understand it—

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Beginning on line 1, page 2—

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gavin.

Mr. GAVIN. When either of these resolutions are brought up, there will be no record vote on either one of them until Thursday?

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Beginning on line 1, page 2 of House Concurrent Resolution 526, it reads as follows—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, listen to this.

Mr. GUBSER. We might as well go home.

Mr. SLATINSHEK (reading):

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),* That it is the sense of the Congress that the President of the United States is supported in his determination and possesses all necessary authority—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Castro regime from exporting its aggressive purposes to any part of this hemisphere by force or the threat of force;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military base capable of endangering the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo, free passage to the Panama Canal, United States missile and space preparations, or the security of this Nation and its citizens; and

(c) to work with other free citizens of this hemisphere and with freedom-loving Cuban refugees to support the legitimate aspirations of the people of Cuba for a return to self-determination.

The CHAIRMAN. Now all in favor of resolution—

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman?

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. HALL. Question.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman.

On yesterday when you read this I sent a note to you in respect to those sections on page 2, starting on line 3, which read as follows:

The President of the United States is supported in his determination.

Now drop down to paragraph (b) on line 9, where it says:

To prevent in Cuba the creation . . .

Now do we understand that the President of the United States has made that determination, to prevent the creation in Cuba of a base that would do these things?

The CHAIRMAN. Well—

Mr. BATES. I want to know that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Wait 1 minute.

Mr. BATES. We have not had that in this testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. I gave that note to the Secretary yesterday.

Mr. BATES. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. For him to read.

Mr. Secretary, have you any comment on it?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

To prevent the creation of an offensive capability endangering the United States, or its subparts—Guantanamo, space, free passage—

Mr. BATES. Mr. Secretary, but it says "creation."

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly.

Mr. BATES. And if they have not already got that created down there now, a beginning, it seems to me I don't understand the situation at all.

Secretary McNAMARA. "Creation" is more than a beginning. It is a complete act. And the act discussed here is the act that yields an offensive military capability.

Mr. BATES. I understand that.

Secretary McNAMARA. "Capable of endangering the United States."

Not the start of creation.

Mr. BATES. This says "to prevent the creation."

Prevent it. This is before the fact and not after the fact.

Secretary McNAMARA. No.

Mr. BATES. That is what this language says.

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, it is perhaps a question of semantics. But I think the meaning is clear.

If the language does not express the meaning, then the language can be changed.

But what it says is that the President has stated he will not allow the acquisition, if you will, by Cuba of an offensive capability sufficient to endanger our national security.

Mr. BATES. Well, let's write what he says.

But the determination to prevent the creation—

The CHAIRMAN. That is the resolution that is going to be presented by the Foreign Affairs Committee. We do not have jurisdiction of it.

Now all in favor—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, wait a bit—

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman. Or it means that we will now go to war because they have created.

But this is the same thing I spoke to you about—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

(Mr. Smart confers with Mr. Bates.)

Mr. BATES. This is the Chair's bill and it was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

7147  
Mr. SMART. Yes.

Mr. BATES. Yes; I understand that.

But the chairman has brought this before this committee now for discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I have just brought it up to tell you the program, as I did yesterday.

We do not have jurisdiction of the matter.

Mr. BATES. I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. But I wanted the committee to know exactly the position with reference to the Cuban situation. That is what prompted that.

Mr. BATES. All I am trying to do is—

The CHAIRMAN. Now it has no relation, direct relation to House Joint Resolution 876, but indirectly it does refer to it because it all relates to defense.

Mr. BATES. But all I am saying is that if the President has already determined to prevent the creation—prevent the creation—I would like to know that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BATES. I don't know.

Is it a fact, Mr. Secretary—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, do I understand—pardon me.

Mr. BATES. Is it a fact?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I think the President in his statement—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute, Mr. Gubser—

Secretary McNAMARA. On September 5, and in his statement at the press conference yesterday, stated that he would act to prevent—I will use the word "acquisition" so we can avoid the argument of whether it is a partial creation or a complete creation—prevent the acquisition by Cuba of an offensive military capability sufficient to endanger the national security of this country.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman—

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking for any vote on Resolution 528.

I merely laid it before the committee, because I brought it up yesterday.

Mr. BATES. Our committee is taking no position?

The CHAIRMAN. And our committee has no jurisdiction over it at all. But it is dovetailed and fits in.

Now the motion is all in favor of reporting House Resolution 876 with the amendments: when your name is called vote aye, and all opposed vote no.

Call the roll.

(Rollcall.)

Mr. SMART. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. A quorum being present.

Mr. SMART. On this vote there are 37 yeas.

The CHAIRMAN. A quorum being present—  
Mr. SMART. And no nays.

The CHAIRMAN. And 37 voting in the affirmative, and no votes in the negative, House Joint Resolution 876 is favorably reported, with the various amendments that are set out in the bill.

Now members of the committee, it is my intention to call this up, I say, on Monday, under a suspension of the rules.

It is the intention of the Foreign Affairs Committee to call up their resolution under suspension of the rules.

So now I want to thank all the members for your indulgence and your attendance.

And I am hoping that this might be the last session.

Thank all of you.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  
(Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the committee was adjourned.)

ad no votes is  
reported with

call this up,

to call up their  
indulgences and

Chairman,